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Advances in biotechnology,' particularly those in recom-
binant DNA techniques, have created the potential for revo-
lutionary change in a number of fields, including the well-
publicized advances in human reproductive technology and
pharmaceutical production. A less-publicized fact is that ge-
netic engineering is also beginning to change the face of
modern agriculture. The development of genetic transfers
between a variety of plant, animal, and even insect species
through biotechnology, as well as the production of mutant
microbial pesticides and other plant-altering organisms, has
already led some experts to claim that the advances in bio-
technology constitute one of the major productivity revolu-
tions in American agricultural history.'
* Policy Director and Counsel, Foundation on Economic Trends,
Washington, D.C.
** President, Foundation on Economic Trends, Washington, D.C.
1. Biotechnology has traditionally been understood to include any
technique that uses living organisms to make a product, improve plants or
animals, or develop microorganisms for specific uses. These techniques
have included the use of industrial microorganisms in the bread-baking
process, the application of biological fermentation to produce alcoholic and
drug products, and the breeding of hybrid plants and animals.
Over the past twenty to thirty years, however, the development of new
techniques has led to a narrower definition of biotechnology. Today, bio-
technology is understood to mean the development of new living organisms
through such techniques as cell fusion and the manipulation of the genetic
component of a cell (DNA) to produce a specific protein molecule. See Rus-
sell, Rush to Market, 9 AMicUS J. 16, 19 (1987).
2. Recently, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) surveyed about 300 leading public and private scientists and re-
search administrators on the effect of biotechnology on agriculture. Based
on these surveys, the OTA identified 28 areas where emerging technolo-
gies are likely to develop before the year 2000 and have major impacts on
the agricultural sector. According to the OTA report:
Many of the technologies examined for this study, such as growth
hormones, monoclonal antibodies, superovulation, and embryo
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These technological developments in agriculture create
complex and troubling issues involving environmental risk,
social and economic dislocation in farm communities, and the
ethical limits of our power to manipulate the genetic traits of
the biotic community.
Remarkably, the important public policy questions raised
by the use of biotechnology, both in general and as applied to
agriculture, have received little attention from the public and
no specific legislation from Congress.8 In the absence of such
specific legislation, biotechnology is being regulated by a net-
work of federal agencies acting under statutes promulgated
before the advent of genetic engineering." This regulatory
scheme has been controversial, fragmented, and inadequate.'
This article describes the problems and the limits of the
current regulatory system in dealing with the historical, envi-
ronmental, socio-economical, and ethical questions created by
the developments in biotechnology, with particular emphasis
on its application to agriculture. Additionally, this article out-
lines an alternative regulatory system for biotechnology in or-
der to address the panoply of public policy questions
presented by this technology.
transfers, are already in the marketplace, while others are still in
the laboratory and will not become available for commercial intro-
duction until 2000.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 31 (1986) [here-
inafter OTA STUDY].
3. Two bills-S.1967, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), introduced by
Senator David Darenberger (R-MN), and H.R. 4452, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), introduced by Representative Don Fugua (D-FL)-were introduced
in the 99th Congress. Both bills attempted to extend the jurisdiction of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
29) (1982) by changing the statute from an information gathering statute
to a "permit" statute. Neither bill had received full committee considera-
tion when the 99th Congress ended, and no similar bills have been intro-
duced in the current Congress.
4. The following statutes are illustrative: the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-392) (1982); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
121 eL. seq.; the Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 3; and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as am-
mended at various sections of 5, 15, 29, 42 and 49 U.S.C.).
5. See Doyle, Biotechnology Needs a "Predictive Ecology," ENVTL POL'Y
INST. PERSP. (Special Annual Edition, 1985); A Novel Strain of Recklessness,




A central question that must be answered prior to large
scale use and/or release of biotechnological products is what
risk such products pose to human health and the general
environment.
Scientists concerned with this question have labeled bio-
technology a low probability-high risk problem. Dr. Martin
Alexander, Chairman of the Environmental Protection
Agency Study Group on Biotechnology, explains the low
probability-high risk threat of biotechnology in the following
way:
The probability of a deleterious effect is the mathemat-
ical product of the probability of release, survival, multipli-
cation, dissemination, and actual harm. Hence, the risk of
genetic engineering is probably small . . . . Nevertheless,
even if the risk is small, the consequences of an unlikely
event could be enormous.
The high risk potential of biotechnology is based on the
fact that each time a genetically-engineered organism is re-
leased, it is released into a complex environment. This envi-
ronment consists of a web of highly synchronized relation-
ships which have developed over millions of years. Each
release of a genetically-engineered organism or other prod-
uct into the environment threatens to disrupt these delicately
balanced relationships. In effect, each release is another pull
of the trigger in a game of ecological roulette. In its 1984
statement of interim policy on small scale field testing of mi-
crobial pesticides, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) wrote:
At present, there is a higher degree of uncertainty in pre-
dicting the ecological impacts of introducing certain micro-
bial pesticides into the environment than with conventional
pesticides. For example, microbial pesticides that are not
native to the area of use or are genetically altered or
manipulated could exhibit increased competitiveness, a
greater ability to survive, a broader host range, production
of a new toxin, or enhanced virulence, compared to indige-
nous microbes, or its introduction could lead to ecological
perturbations. Moreover, because microorganisms can
reproduce and be disseminated by a number of different
6. Alexander, Ecological Consequences: Reducing the Uncertainties, I Is-
SUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 57, 64 (1985).
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mechanisms, they may be difficult to control or eradicate
after being introduced. Finally, the genetic material in
some genetically modified microbes may be unstable or
transferable to other organisms.'
In a recent survey, one hundred of the top scientists in the
United States acknowledged the potential benefits of genetic
engineering, but warned that "its imprudent or careless use
* . . could lead to irreversible, devastating damage to [the]
ecology [of the planet].""
Environmental scientists compare the risk of releasing bi-
otechnological products to those we have encountered in in-
troducing exotic organisms to North American habitats.
While most of these organisms have adapted to our ecosys-
tems, several, such as Chestnut Blight, Kudzu vine, Dutch
Elm disease, and the Gypsy moth, have wreaked considerable
havoc on the environment.'
In the future, industry and agriculture are expected to
introduce thousands of new genetically engineered products
into the environment each year' 0-just as they have intro-
duced thousands of new petro-chemical products each year.
As Dr. Alexander has written, our experience with petro-
chemicals should be instructive. When only a few chemicals
were in daily use, the threat to the ecosystem was relatively
small. But now that annual chemical production exceeds one
billion pounds per year, the possibility of exposure and con-
tamination are widespread.11 In the same way, as the scope
of genetic engineering expands, so too will the risk of catas-
trophe.
7. Microbial Pesticides: Interim Policy on Small Scale Field Testing,
49 Fed. Reg. 40,659, 40,660 (1984).
8. Gilbert, The Minds Behind the Top 100: Who They Are, What They
Think, What the Future Holds, 93 ScIENcE DIGEST, 64, 65 (1985).
9. Note, for example, that since its introduction into the United
States in the early 1980s, Dutch Elm disease has killed more than one half
of the nation's elm trees. Mansfield, Elm Street Blues, 37 AM. HERITAGE 96,
99 (1986). The U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that in 1981 the
Gypsy moth caused $764 million in property damage nationwide, with 10
percent of the damage occurring in forests and 90 percent occurring in
recreational and residential areas. Jackson, Gypsy Invaders Seize New Ground
in their War Against our Trees, 15 SMITHSONIAN 47, 51 (1984). In 1986,
Gypsy moths defoliated 2.5 million acres of forest from Maine to Virginia,
damaging 40 percent more acreage than in the year before. WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 1986, at 35, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., supra note 2.
11. Alexander, supra note 6. at 64.
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Indeed, the long-term impact of thousands upon
thousands of genetically-modified organisms could well
eclipse the damage that has resulted from the wholesale re-
lease of petro-chemical products into the earth's ecosys-
tems.1" A chemical which is found to be hazardous does not
reproduce itself, and though it might spread, its concentra-
tion will become increasingly dilute. Thus, the damage
caused by petrochemicals is localized and dissipates with time.
Biotechnological organisms, however, spread and reproduce
themselves, with the disturbance to the ecosystem increasing
and intensifying as the organisms multiply. The problem will
not remain localized, but will expand in a potentially irrevers-
ible manner.
Given this hazardous scenario, some scientists have rec-
ommended a moratorium on the release of biotechnological
products until a "predictive ecology" on the risks presented
by these products has been developed."3 The EPA Study
Group on Biotechnology has also suggested immediate re-
search and development of such a predictive method. 4 The
EPA Study Group suggests that at least five questions must be
answered in order to assess the safety of biotechnological
products:
1) Will it survive?
2) Will it multiply?
3) Will it transfer its inserted genetic traits to other
species?
4) Will it be transported to other sites?, and
5) Will it have a deleterious effect?"
Remarkably, the regulatory agencies, especially those in-
volved in agricultural research, have repeatedly shirked their
responsibility to assess the health and environmental risks of
biotechnology." A recent report by the General Accounting
12. Id. at 64-65.
13. E.g., Doyle, supra note 5.
14. In a 1986 report, the Study Group wrote: "'The EPA should
mount a research effort to assess possible perturbations in natural commu-
nities related to genetically engineered microorganisms. Research also
should be conducted on the use of microcosms as models for natural com-
munities, using the microcosms to evaluate effects of viable agents, as has
been done for chemicals." SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSESSING EPA's BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND INFOR-
MATION NEEDS: REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON BIOTECHNOLOGY 4 (1986)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON BIOTECHNOLOGY].
15. See id. at 2-5; Alexander, supra note 6, at 61-64.
16. Bennett, GAO Report Finds Federal Agencies' Risk Assessment Proce-
dures Lacking, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1986 at 3.
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Office (GAO) showed that the United States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA's) Agricultural Research Service is
spending close to thirty million dollars on agricultural bio-
technology research, and yet only 2-4% of this research is de-
voted to risk assessment." The USDA's Cooperative State
Research Service is spending close to fifty million dollars on
biotechnology research, and yet at most only 15-20% of this
research is directly aimed at risk assessment.1 8 By its own ad-
mission, the EPA has "essentially no program" to assess the
environmental effects of the release of biotechnological pro-
ducts."'
In addition to their failure to conduct risk assessment re-
search, two recent actions, one involving the EPA and the
other the USDA, revealed the inadequacy and outright blun-
dering apparent in the present regulation of agricultural
biotechnological products by the federal government.
In the first instance, the EPA suspended the field-testing
permit of a California biotechnology company, Advanced Ge-
netic Sciences, claiming that the company deliberately falsi-
fied data on the pathogenicity tests of a genetically-engi-
neered microbe designed to prevent frost from forming on
plants.2 0 The company injected the chemical into 45 fruit and
nut trees growing on a roof in Oakland, but told the EPA
that the injections had been made inside a greenhouse."1 Af-
ter the Foundation on Economic Trends reported these vio-
lations, the EPA suspended the company's license.' A subse-
quent Congressional investigation criticized both the com-
pany and the regulation of biotechnology by the EPA."8
In another incident, the Foundation on Economic
Trends discovered that the USDA and its Animal and Plant
Inspection Service had run roughshod over the entire regula-
17. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY:
ANALYSIS OF FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH 5-6 (1986).
18. Id.
19. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14,
at 4.
20. Field-Testing Permit for Genetic Concern Lifted for False Data, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 25, 1986, §A, at 1, col. 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Issues in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology: From Research to
Release: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-36 (1986)
(statements of Dr. John Bedbrook, Advanced Genetic Sciences, and Dr.




tory process by authorizing the release of a genetically
engineered vaccine into the open environment.2 ' This was
the first time a genetically-altered virus had been released
into the environment, and yet, far from exercising the cau-
tion such an initial release would require, the USDA ne-
glected to require the license applicant, the Biologics Corpo-
ration, to comply with the National Institute of Health (NIH)
Guidelines on Research Involving Recombinant DNA mole-
cules, as required by its own directives.2 The USDA also
failed to subject the deliberate release of the recombinant
vaccine to the required intra-agency review procedures."
Top officials at the USDA acknowledged the Agency's
errors in this incident, and one senior official stated that the
Agency had "violated . . .the public's trust.""1 In response
to the Foundation's disclosures, the USDA temporarily sus-
pended the vaccine license, only to reinstate it after a brief
period.2 8 A Congressional investigation of the matter re-
vealed substantial violations by the researchers and glaring
inadequacies in the USDA regulatory scheme. Finally, the
NIH investigated the matter and censured the researcher,"0
while also criticizing ambiguities in its own Recombinant
DNA Guidelines.3
Over the past few decades, federal policy has focused on
the narrow question of the potential short-term economic
benefits of new scientific and technological breakthroughs,
with little or no attention paid to the long term environmen-
tal costs of the new technologies. It is now apparent that at
the beginning of the nuclear technology and petro-chemical
revolutions, the government failed to address the "hard" en-
vironmental questions concerning the long term effects of
these technologies on the ecosystem. As a result, this genera-
tion, and succeeding ones, is, and will continue to be, forced
to deal with a mounting environmental bill that includes nu-
24. See U.S. Quietly Approved the Sale of Genetically Altered Vaccine, N.Y.




28. Release of a Gene-Altered Virus is Halted by U.S. After Challenge,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1986, §A, at 1, col. 2.
29. Hearings, supra note 23, at 47-48 (statement of Alan Tracy, Act-
ing Secretary of Marketing & Inspection, U.S. Department of Agriculture).
30. Unauthorized Genetic Field Tests Criticized, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1986, §A, at 23, col. 1.
31. Id.
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clear waste, acid rain, toxic waste dumps, erosion, clean water
depletion, and the depletion of ozone in the atmosphere.
With the emergence of the genetic engineering revolu-
tion, the federal government is once again without a coher-
ent and enforceable risk assessment framework to assure that
proper regard is taken for the long term health of the envi-
ronment. Until government agencies conduct adequate risk
assessment and show the will and ability to enforce such a
protocol, the release of genetically-engineered microorga-
nisms into the environment should not be permitted.
H. SocIo-ECONoMic DISLOCATION
The use of biotechnology, especially in agriculture, cre-
ates the potential for considerable social and economic dislo-
cation in the American farming community.
For example, the USDA's Agricultural Research Service
(ARS) has made significant investments in biotechnology. 1
The ARS, through its comprehensive information dissemina-
tion program, effects virtually every American agricultural
practice. The ARS's investment in, and dissemination of, ag-
ricultural genetic engineering and animal husbandry prac-
tices, with their high capital costs and high yields, favors
large, well-capitalized farms over smaller farms; high density
animal husbandry over more humane methods; the increased
use of artificial foods, pesticides and disease control methods
over more organic approaches; and the more intensive use of
crop fields resulting in adverse impacts on soil and water.
Large technology transfers such as those sponsored by
the ARS are not the only source of social and economic dislo-
cation in agriculture caused by biotechnology. Even a single
biotechnological product can have significant adverse effects.
A timely illustration is the recent research and development
of bovine growth hormone (BGH). This genetically-produced
growth hormone can increase milk production by at least 30
percent per dairy cow. 83 Besides the ethical questions raised
by the massive use of this hormone on dairy cows,3 BGH
32. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at
6.
33. See Russell, supra note 1, at 19.
34. Preliminary research has indicated that dairy cows receiving
higher doses of BGH appear to have more reproductive problems and mas-
titis. See, e.g., Soderholm, Otterby, Linn, Momont, Romagnoli, Hansen and
Annexstad, Efficacy of Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin (rbSTH) for
Lactating Cows (unpublished paper, University of Minnesota, St. Paul).
[Vol. 3
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poses a serious threat to the economic well-being of many
dairy farmers. Professor Robert Kalter, an agricultural econ-
omist at Cornell University, estimates that milk prices may
fall 10-15 percent within the first three years of the introduc-
tion of BGH." He further estimates that the number of dairy
farms may have to be reduced 25-30 percent to restore mar-
ket equilibrium." A report by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment concluded that BGH will cause a
shift in production from the smaller, traditional dairies in the
Great Lakes and Northeast regions to the larger, newer oper-
ations in the Southwest and West.' 7 These adjustments will
almost certainly have dramatic social, economic, and cultural
effects.
Neither the EPA nor the USDA are authorized by stat-
ute, or institutionally capable, of making the public policy
choices that the introduction of even one biotechnological
product presents. Decisions affecting the economic and social
welfare of such a large segment of the populace should be
made by the public through the political process, and not by
government bureaucrats.
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The profound effects of biotechnology raise difficult eth-
ical questions. Its potential in human reproduction raises new
concerns over the morality of eugenics," and the current use
of the technology to create new biological weapons further
threatens human life. Unfortunately, the ethical dilemmas
posed by the "advances" in biotechnology are seldom con-
sidered.
The use of biotechnology in agriculture is creating ethi-
cal questions no less important than those created in other
areas. For example, the USDA has developed the "Animal
Productivity Research Program" conducted under the aus-
pices of the ARS. For decades this program has devoted itself
to the production of larger, faster reproducing livestock. Re-
cently, the program has focused on genetic engineering ex-
periments, including the introduction of human growth hor-
mones into livestock. 8' In a recent law suit, the Foundation
35. Will Growth Hormone Swell Milk Surplus? 233 SCIENCE 151 (1986).
36. Id.
37. See Russell, supra note 1, at 18.
38. See, e.g., T. HOWARD & J. RIFKIN, WHO SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977).
39. See, e.g., McDonald, Rapid-Growth Genes Could Yield 'Super Live-
stock', 27 THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (1984).
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on Economic Trends challenged this program for its failure
to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).'0 The Foundation also challenged the program as
violative of the "biological integrity" of the species being ge-
netically altered.' Subsequent to the suit many further ex-
periments were performed, as genetic material was trans-
ferred between species. One of the most bizarre experiments
involved the recent transfer of firefly genetic material into
tobacco plants to create "glowing" plants."'
These experiments bring up several historical, ethical,
and philosophical questions. What is wrong with a cow the
size of an elephant, or a sheep the size of a horse, or "glow-
ing" tobacco plants? Is there any meaning in the morphology
of animals or plants, both internally and externally? Should
we alter or mutate, perhaps permanently, the forms and
shapes of the biotic community so that they better conform
to our agricultural or industrial needs? Do plants and animals
have any right to be treated as sufficient "ends" in them-
selves, and not merely as "means" in a system of production?
What are the ethical implications of the likely proposal to en-
gineer plant or animal genetic material into humans? Finally,
who is to decide these issues: Congress? Scientists? Corpora-
tions? Theologians? The public? Federal agencies?
Right now, bureaucrats, often under significant pressure
from industry and the executive branch, are deciding these
issues."s These civil servants are ill-equipped and lack the
statutory authority to make such decisions. Nonetheless, the
EPA and the USDA are actually implementing policy involv-
ing such problems as the meaning of the forms and structures
of the biotic world, the ethical limits of our destruction and
manipulation of nature, and the rights of our fellow creatures
and ourselves. These questions will take much time and inter-
disciplinary consideration to resolve. The time for such anal-
ysis will not be available if crucial decision-making on the im-
40. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block, Civil Action No. 84-
3045 (D.D.C. 1986).
41. Id.
42. One hummorist has written:
Just think of the enormous commercial potential. Tobacco grow-
ers will love it. No need to give migrant workers the night off:
they can pick the stuff in the dark. Inveterate nocturnal smokers
would no longer have to grope for the pack about 2 a.m.
Byrne, A Fly-By-Light Discovery, THE SCIENTwrT, Dec. 15, 1986, at 12.
43. See, e.g., A Test. Do Microbes and Politics Mix?, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 1986, §B, at 6, col. 4.
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plementation of this technology is left to agency bureaucrats
under pressure from commercial and scientific special inter-
est groups.
IV. A NEW REGULATORY STATUTE FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
The current regulation of biotechnology has been shown
to be inadequate and incompetent in assessing the environ-
mental risks of this technology. It is apparent that the federal
agencies, acting under their present statutory authorization,
are ill-suited and not empowered to decide the epic social,
ethical, and economical questions which genetic engineering
presents. Yet, even as the various federal agencies become
further enmeshed and confused in the regulatory tangle of
biotechnology, the industry continues to grow exponentially,
as government infuses hundreds of millions of dollars into re-
search.44 Given this chaotic and dangerous situation, it is im-
perative that Congress pass a comprehensive regulatory stat-
ute governing the development and implementation of bio-
technology. As the noted environmental author and attorney
Thomas 0. McGarity has written, such a statute "would give
Congress the opportunity to craft reporting, testing, and reg-
ulatory requirements to the precise needs of biotechnology,
instead of requiring existing agencies to force new regulatory
issues into as unsatisfactory statutory mold."' 6
A threshold question to any Congressional or public de-
bate over biotechnology is whether capability must always be
identified with desirability; that is, we must decide if the fun-
damental ethical, socio-economical, and environmental inter-
ests of society are, at critical points, antithetical to the unim-
peded development of biotechnology. In the agricultural
area, this includes decisions on the desirability of government
programs funding the permanent altering of the internal and
external structures of animals and plants, the benefits of ever
larger, more capitalized, high-technology farms, with the at-
tendant dislocation of farm communities and culture, and our
readiness to face the deliberate release of thousands of genet-
ically-engineered organisms into the environment-a few
with at least potentially catastrophic results.
In short, as a polity, we must decide whether technology
must always alter society, or whether society, in pursuit of its
44. See, e.g., Crawford, Biotech Market Changing Rapidly, 231 ScIENcE,
12-14 (1986). Going for the Gene Green, TIME, Nov. 4, 1985, at 56; Biotechnol-
ogy: the New Growth Industry, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1985, at 38, col. 3.
45. McGarity, Regulating Biotechnology, 1 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, 40, 51-52 (1985).
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public policy goals, may limit or curtail technology. Have we
not reached a juncture at which a "free" society and a "di-
rected" genetic engineer might be preferable to "free" ge-
netic engineering and a society "directed" by its technology?
V. A PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Given this background, a legislature's first duty is not to
regulate a technology, but rather to decide what parts, if any,
of a new technology are compatible with societal goals and
ethical standards. The choice cannot be avoided. Should the
legislature fail to decide, these decisions will be made none-
theless. These decisions will not be made by the general pop-
ulation through the political process, but by a small coterie of
scientists, venture capitalists, and government bureaucrats, all
individuals with a vested interest in a smooth road to expan-
sion and implementation of genetic engineering.
Only after the areas of public interest in biotechnology
are identified and articulated should the legislature construct
a regulatory procedure to govern those areas of biotechnol-
ogy that are being implemented. Above all, such a regulatory
scheme must provide for the comprehensive analysis of all fu-
ture genetically-engineered products in biotechnology pro-
grams.
This analysis should include the preparation of a com-
prehensive environmental, social, and cultural impact state-
ment for each new biotechnology proposal. Such a compre-
hensive impact statement is the only regulatory measure
which could adequately provide decision-makers with the full
range of information required to make the choice as to the
ultimate costs and benefits of a biotechnology project.
In order to implement this new policy initiative, there
should be two advisory committees connected with each fed-
eral agency: a scientific committee; and a broader based re-
view committee.
The scientific committee would identify and evaluate the
potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering
experiments or introducing products in order to determine
what additional research, if any, would be necessary to assure
adequate consideration and minimization of substantial risks.
In addition to the scientific committee, it is also important
that each federal agency establish a review committee with
the appropriate expertise to evaluate the "total impact" of
each new genetic engineering proposal.
[Vol. 3
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These governmental committees should be composed of
experts from a wide range of disciplines, including econo-
mists, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, theologians,
ethicists, political scientists, and ecologists-in other words,
public representatives as well as scientific specialists. Such a
reasonable balance of the relevant disciplines would be im-
portant to ensure that public concerns are articulated. In this
way, each genetic engineering proposal would be assessed in
terms of its total impact on society. It is essential that we be-
gin to evaluate genetic engineering proposals in light of the
overall context in which they will be introduced to properly
judge the short-term and long-term costs and benefits.
While the scientific and review committees would make
recommendations rather than decisions, those recommenda-
tions would be given great weight in the final agency deci-
sion. Accordingly, it would be important that each of the
committee experts be voting members, rather than outside
consultants, even though specialized experts might have to be
retained occasionally as consultants.
The agency review committees would also be free from
the conflicts of interest which stem from the linkage of com-
mittee members to biotechnology companies.
To ensure public participation in decisions regarding
genetic engineering research and its commercial application,
the Foundation on Economic Trends suggests that all agency
reviews be made available for public comment and discussion
prior to any agency decision. This means that adequate pub-
lic access to the internal deliberations of the agency review
committee is necessary.
In evaluating proposals involving scientific uncertainties
and/or the lack of data, the same type of "worst case" analy-
sis required by the NEPA for environmental impact state-
ments should be conducted by the agency.' 0
After the advisory committees issue their recommenda-
tion to the agency decision-maker, a detailed proposal, in-
cluding a description of the safeguards to be required if the
decision is to grant the application, would be issued, with ade-
quate time for public review and comment before a final de-
cision is made.
46. Under the NEPA, federal agencies are required to evaluate the
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts associated with their ac-
tions. Such evaluation is to include "'impacts which have catastrophic conse-
quences, even if their probability of occurrence is low." 40 C.F.R. §1502-
22(b) (1986).
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In addition to satisfying the specific data requirements
specified by the agency for a particular proposal, the burden
of persuasion would be on the applicant to demonstrate that
the proposed release meets the applicable substantive stan-
dard. The standard should probably be that the release will
not present a significant risk to either public health or the
environment, and no permit should be issued unless that bur-
den is satisfied.
A central registry, accessible to all interested federal reg-
ulatory agencies, would be established to contain data on the
proposed, approved, and completed deliberate releases, to
benefit the regulating agencies in evaluating proposals pend-
ing before them. A public version of the same registry would
also be maintained, with the appropriate excision of confiden-
tial business information.
The agencies would develop generic requirements for
particular classes of proposed releases as promptly as possible
after an opportunity for public discussion and review. Where
proponents could demonstrate that their proposals satisfied
such requirements, individual permit proceedings, which are
expensive and time-consuming, would be unnecessary.
Finally, Congress should enact legislation mandating that
every government agency involved with regulation in this
area prepare a total impact statement and adhere to the regu-
latory procedures described above.
CONCLUSION
Biotechnology, especially as applied to agriculture, can-
not be responsibly regulated without proper regard for the
full range of long-term environmental, social, and ethical
concerns which the technology presents. Experience with the
petro-chemical and nuclear industries teaches us that unless
such Iong-term concerns are addressed, technology will de-
velop without social constraint, resulting in enormous cost to
the environment and to society.
Because biotechnology is still in its early stages, society,
for the first time, has the opportunity to significantly regulate
a new technology before its major adverse impacts have oc-
curred. We ignore this opportunity at our peril. The regula-
tory proposal described above will create the potential for so-
ciety to govern the future of technology rather than allowing
technology to govern the future of society and the fate of the
natural world.
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